Published: United States Army, Center of Military History

The origin of the ranger tradition lies in the seventeenth century wars

between colonists and Native American tribes. In the original concept

rangers were full-time soldiers employed by the colonial governments to

"range" between fixed frontier fortifications as a reconnaissance system

to provide early warning of hostile raids. In offensive operations they

became scouts and guides, locating targets (such as villages) for task

forces drawn from the militia or other colonial troops.

By 1675-1676 a new element appeared in the ranger concept. Benjamin Church

(1639-1718) of Massachusetts developed a special full-time unit mixing

white colonists selected for frontier skills with friendly Indians to

carry out offensive strikes against hostile Indians in terrain where

normal militia units were ineffective. In fact, his memoirs published in

1716 by a son are the first American military manual.

The traditional ranger usage reached its peak during the French and Indian

War. Robert Rogers of New Hampshire organized a corps of New England

woodsmen as full-time Provincials directly under British military auspices

and paid out of British funds. The companies supported British operations

against French Canada on the New York and St. Lawrence River fronts. They

occasionally operated with friendly Indians, but more commonly served the

British as a substitute for traditional allies. Astute British commanders

assigned regular British officers to Rogers' Rangers for training in

wilderness warfare which they could then pass on to their normal regiments.

Veterans of this corps played a major role in the Continental Army during

the Revolution, including Major General Israel Putnam and Brigadier

Generals John Stark and Moses Hazen. The tranditional ranger usage had

only limited application during that later war. Various state governments

did employ such units for local frontier security, but the Continental

Army formed very few, in part because George Washington considered

frontier security to be a local responsibility and focused national

military forces on opposing regular British and German units in a formal

battlefield context.

Other than the regiments and separate companies of riflemen from

Pennsylvania and the states to the south, who really functioned as light

infantry rather than rangers, the Continental Army only formed two

functional ranger units. Knowlton's Rangers, a provisional three-company

unit of volunteers from Connecticut and Massachusetts line regiments under

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton, came into being during the late summer

of 1776 at New York City. It performed excellently in a light infantry

role at the battle of Harlem Heights on 16 September 1776, but Knowlton

suffered a mortal wound. Two months later the remnants of the corps fell

into British hands when Fort Washington surrendered. Captain Nathan Hale

of this corps gained immortality as a brave but singularly inept spy.

Whitcomb's Rangers started as a similar provisional unit on the Lake

Champlain front in 1776. It gained permanent status as a two-company force

on 15 October of that year and provided reconnaissance capability to the

Northern Department until 1 January 1781 when it disbanded at Coos, New

Hampshire, as part of a general reorganization of the Continental Army.

Most of Whitcomb's men came from New Hampshire and the Hampshire Grants

(now Vermont).

Other units in the Continental Army either used the term ranger in their

designation or were commonly called rangers, but did not serve in that

capacity in the traditional sense. South Carolina and Georgia each raised

mounted ranger units in 1775-1776, but when they became part of the

Continental Army during the summer of 1776 they transformed into mounted

infantry. In fact over the period of several years the 3d South Carolina

Regiment gradually evolved into a line infantry regiment. When Washington

authorized Gist's Additional Continental Regiment in 1777 he intended to

man it with a mixture of Caucasian southern frontiersmen and members of

the Cherokee and related tribes. Washington wanted to use it as a vehicle

for insuring tribal support--its Native American members would become

hostages for the good behavior of the rest of the tribe--as well as a

combat element. The regiment never recruited the Indian component, and

changes in British operations led to the transformation of the white

elements into normal infantry.

Contrary to myth, the light troops in the Continental Army overwhelmingly

followed European doctrinal concepts. The four regiments of light dragoons

raised in 1777 as a reconnaissance force derived from European

developments in light cavalry during the eighteenth century. Only during a

brief period in the winter of 1777-1778 did the Continental Army

experiment with the idea of employing them as a shock force.

Light infantry companies added to the regimental organization of each

Continental Army infantry regiment in 1778 also had European roots. The

American leadership stressed the ideas of Maurice, comte de Saxe and the

comte de Guibert, two leading French military theorists, which advocated

cross-training every soldier to perform both line or light infantry roles

to allow mission flexibility. Light companies normally assembled into

provisional battalions at the start of each year's campaign and acted as a

special strike force in traditional battlefield roles, not as a

reconnaissance element.

The Continental Army's other light troops sprang from a relatively new

European concept not the native American ranger tradition. During the

Seven Years' War most European armies developed partisan corps (also

called frei korps). Originally fielded by the French to counter Austrian

irregulars recruited in the Balkans, they filled a unique niche by

providing deep security around an army in the field or carried out raids

behind enemy lines. The Continental Army authorized several of these

formations in 1777 and 1778, primarily as a vehicle to employ European

volunteers who could not be inserted into existing regiments without

provoking major arguments over rank, or because of language barriers.

"Light Horse Harry" Lee of Virginia (the father of Robert E. Lee) raised

the only American-born unit under this concept. Each partisan unit in the

Continental Army, however, had a unique organizational structure.

The 1781 reorganization of the Continental resolved the issue of light

troops by bringing greater centralized control. The light infantry

companies continued under their existing practice of forming provisional

battalions for each campaign season. The four regiments of light dragoons

transformed into combined arms Legionary Corps composed of four mounted

and two dismounted troops; the various partisan elements consolidated into

two Partisan Corps, each with three mounted and three dismounted troops.

The structure of the legionary corps focused on providing close

reconnaissance and security patrols for a field army although various

operational and manpower problems hampered most of the regiments from

achieving complete success.

The 1st Partisan Corps under the Frenchman "Colonel Armand" (the marquis

de la Rouerie) and the 2d under Lee both drew assignments in Major General

Nathanael Greene's Southern Department. Armand's remained a shell during

1781, but Lee had great success in the Carolinas carrying out those

specific missions for which the 3-3 mix of mounted and dismounted troops

had been designed. In formal battles it provided unblemished flank

security, but it was even better in rear battle by conducting deep raids

against British logistical bases. Lee particularly shined when his

regulars stiffened the irregular local forces of leaders like Francis

("Swamp Fox") Marion. The mix of mounted and dismounted men gave it

somewhat greater staying power in independent firefights while also

allowing rapid forced marches (each light infantryman held on to a

dragoon's stirrups).

None of the light units employed by the Continental Army carried out a

training role as Rogers' Rangers had during the French and Indian War. In

fact, Major General Friedrich von Steuben wrote a separate drill manual

for them in late 1780. He and Washington intended it to be the companion

to the famous "Blue Book", but operational factors prevented its

publication and distribution.